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that Acheson was "evidently aware that the impression would be on world public opinion of a direct refusal to accept the clear-cut Soviet proposals aiming... at a speedy peace treaty." Zhukov attributes to this awareness Acheson's "unconcealed irritation," his "very quiet manner," his "confused and muddled" arguments, and his attempt to "switch attention to other matters." Faced with a "quandary," Acheson, supported by Bevin and Schuman, "did not reject the proposals outright, but suggested that they be referred for analysis to the deputy ministers"—a "maneuver" designed to "shelve the Soviet proposals." And thereby the Western delegations "caused the collapse of the... propaganda structure which they had been building up for three weeks" and which was aimed at "creating the impression that they are championing the interests of the Germans. ... The USSR delegation proved convincingly that such assertions are insincere.... (And) by rejecting the Soviet proposals,... the Western Powers have involuntarily confirmed the correctness of the (Soviet) arguments." Other commentaries also devote explicit attention to the subject of propaganda. Linetsky, for example, making much of the "systematic" Western rejection of all of the "concrete" Soviet proposals, accuses the BBC of attempting to reverse the roles and explains the attempt as "an effort to mislead world public opinion so that the blame can be shifted over to the Soviet Union well in advance." Varying the theme, a Soviet-controlled German broadcast charges that "by our rejection of all Soviet proposals, the three Western ministers obviously thought that... they could induce the Soviet Foreign Minister to break off the Conference" and therefore blame the USSR for "having torpedoed the Conference and having prevented Germany's unity." But the USSR relentlessly pursued the only path leading to peace and submitted concrete suggestions, "foremost among them" being the peace treaty proposals; as a result, "the Western Powers were forced to admit that their... attempts at having the Conference torpedoed by the Soviet Union had failed pitifully."

WHAT DOES THE WEST WANT? WHY DID THEY WANT TO CONVENE THIS CONFERENCE? Having "proved" that the Western Powers are striving to maintain indefinitely the occupation regime and a dismembered Germany, the above-mentioned Zhukov article proceeds to apply to them a question that American observers have repeatedly raised about the USSR. "Diplomatic observers," says Zhukov, "have repeatedly asked themselves the question: What do the delegations of the Western Powers really want? Why did they bring up the question of calling the current session of the CFM?"* The answer is that they came to Paris "to set aside the fundamental problems... and to come to terms... only (on) resumption of trade with Eastern Germany." But even the motives for this alleged goal are declared suspect: resumption of trade is of vital concern to the "German-American trusts in the Western Zone"; Americans want to relieve the economic stagnation of West Germany and need an Eastern outlet for West-German goods that would otherwise compete with American products; "it seems that the Americans have finally understood that the East has always been a natural and traditional market for German goods" and the American economic "crisis" is compelling them "to grasp at any and every opportunity to reduce excessive expenditures." And returning in his final paragraph to the Soviet proposals, Zhukov declares that on their basis "agreement could be reached on all questions, including the economic question." Thus, he lays the argument for accusing the West of obstructing solution of the "fundamental problems" and for attributing an invidious role to the Western Powers and a positive role to the USSR** in the event of a limited economic agreement. Satellite and Soviet-controlled German broadcasts echo the same line.

YUGOSLAV COMMENT: The Yugoslav Press Agency, TANYUG, echoing the Soviet line, reports the Western attempt to extend their regime to "East Germany, which is developing in a democratic spirit under (Soviet) protection." TANYUG also complains that Austria's Gruber had long talks with all the Big Four ministers, whereas only Schuman talked with the Yugoslav Ambassador about the Austrian treaty; if Gruber's talks established a basis for agreement, this will be "an incomprehensible act directed against Yugoslav interests." Soviet commentaries have not mentioned the subject of an Austrian peace treaty.

* Earlier Soviet and Satellite broadcasts gave the USSR the credit for the Conference meeting; now, when it suits the propagandist's purpose, the West "brought up the question."

** In other contexts, also, Soviet commentaries continue their outspoken espousal of East-West trade.

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